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COMPATIBILISM AND THE  
SINLESSNESS OF THE REDEEMED IN HEAVEN
Steven B. Cowan
In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe seek 
to respond to the so-called “Problem of Heavenly Freedom,” the problem of 
explaining how the redeemed in heaven can be free yet incapable of sinning. 
In the course of offering their solution, they argue that compatibilism is in-
adequate as a solution because it (1) undermines the free will defense against 
the logical problem of evil, and (2) exacerbates the problem of evil by making 
God the “author of sin.” In this paper, I respond to these charges and argue 
that compatibilism can offer a satisfactory explanation for the sinlessness of 
the redeemed in heaven. I also raise some problems for Pawl’s and Timpe’s 
incompatibilist solution.
It is a relatively uncontroversial item of Christian orthodoxy that the re-
deemed in heaven are incapable of sinning. Having been finally and fully 
glorified, purged of all remaining corruption and filled with only holy de-
sires and dispositions, doing evil is not just something that the redeemed 
will not do, but is something that they simply cannot do. The question 
immediately arises, then: Is there free will in heaven? For the libertarian, 
who believes that human freedom and responsibility are incompatible 
with determinism, the impeccability of the redeemed in heaven creates a 
serious tension. For if the redeemed in heaven cannot sin, then one might 
conclude that there is no (or at least no morally significant) free will in 
heaven. And if there is no morally significant free will in heaven—where 
humans are at their best and are, we might say, most fully human—then 
we might also wonder what is so important about free will on earth.
In a recent article, Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe address this so-
called Problem of Heavenly Freedom.1 As they put it, “One may wonder: how 
can someone be free and yet incapable of sinning? If the redeemed are 
kept from sinning, their wills must be reined in, at least in some way. 
And, if their wills are reined in, it doesn’t seem right to say that they are 
free.”2 Pawl and Timpe believe that it is part of traditional orthodoxy that 
the redeemed in heaven are free, and it is this belief that creates the tension 
1Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” Faith 
and Philosophy 26.4 (October 2009): 398–419.
2Ibid., 399 (emphasis in original).
COMPATIBILISM AND THE SINLESSNESS OF THE REDEEMED 417
for the libertarian. The problem is to defend the consistency of the follow-
ing claims:
(1) The redeemed in heaven have free will, and
(2) The redeemed in heaven are no longer capable of sinning.
Pawl and Timpe discuss five possible solutions to the Problem of Heav-
enly Freedom, four of which they reject in favor of their own preferred 
solution. The first solution they reject is compatiblism which, at face value, 
offers the simplest and most straightforward resolution. The dilemma 
posed in the Problem of Heavenly Freedom is generated only on the 
assumption that the freedom mentioned in (1) above is libertarian freedom. 
The compatibilist, of course, understands human freedom in a way that is 
compatible with determinism. Specifically, a compatibilist contends that an 
agent is free (and morally responsible) just in case his actions are the result 
of his own desires and intentions exercised without external coercions or 
constraints. Or, as Lynne Rudder Baker puts it, a person is appropriately 
free if she “has the will that she wants to have.”3 On this view of freedom, 
the Problem of Heavenly Freedom evaporates. For the redeemed in heaven, 
having characters that are perfectly formed to want only what is good and 
right, will consistently freely choose only what is good and right and will 
be incapable of choosing what is wrong. Their perfectly formed characters 
will prevent them from choosing what is wrong because they prevent them 
from wanting what is wrong.
As simple and straightforward as the compatibilist solution is, Pawl 
and Timpe nevertheless reject it. In this paper, I want to examine the rea-
sons offered by Pawl and Timpe for rejecting the compatibilist solution to 
the Problem of Heavenly Freedom. I believe that the compatibilist solution 
can be adequately defended against their (and other related) objections. 
Secondarily, I also intend to raise a few problems for their preferred lib-
ertarian solution.
Does Compatibilism Undermine the Free Will Defense?
An interesting feature of Pawl’s and Timpe’s objection to the compatibilist 
solution is that it is not exactly the objection that one might expect. More 
typical would be an attack on the coherence of compatibilist freedom, or 
the charge that compatibilism makes God the author of evil. These are 
standard reasons for objecting to compatiblism in general and to com-
patibilist solutions to theological problems like the one under discussion 
here. But rather than focus on these standard kinds of problems, Pawl 
and Timpe reject the compatibilist solution to the Problem of Heavenly 
Freedom primarily because it would undermine their preferred solution 
3Lynne Rudder Baker, “Why Christians Should not Be Libertarians: An Augustinian 
Challenge,” Faith and Philosophy 20.4 (October 2003): 460–478. This characterization of free-
dom finds its origin in Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” 
Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5–20.
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to the logical problem of evil, namely, the Free Will Defense (FWD). As 
Pawl and Timpe explain,
According to the Free Will Defense, the reason that moral evils do not con-
tradict God’s essential goodness is that it is possible that the existence of 
free will . . . is such a great good that it justifies the existence of the moral 
evil that it makes possible.4
Pawl and Timpe have a hard time seeing how compatibilism can be 
squared with the FWD, and it’s not hard to see why they might think so. 
For on the assumption that humans have compatibilist freedom, it would 
seem logically possible for God to create a world in which creatures were 
(compatibilistically) free and yet never do evil—because God creates them 
with characters such that they never desire and thus never choose to do 
evil. The FWD works only if we assume that creatures have a kind of free-
dom that is incompatible with determinism—libertarian freedom—so that 
God cannot create a world in which free creatures never go wrong unless 
those creatures consistently and freely choose to cooperate with God in 
never choosing to go wrong. In other words, the FWD works only if crea-
tures have the libertarian freedom that makes it possible for them to sin.
Now I think that all of this is right as far as it goes. In order to utilize 
the FWD, one must assume a libertarian notion of freedom at least as a 
working hypothesis. However, I do not believe that this admission would 
disallow me, a compatibilist, from utilizing the FWD and claiming that it 
actually works—as a defense. It would only be necessary for the compati-
bilist to deny that it works as a theodicy. Indeed, I do not think that the 
FWD works as a theodicy whether one is a compatibilist or a libertarian. 
Let me explain.
It has become standard fare in discussions of the logical problem of 
evil to distinguish between a defense and a theodicy. A theodicy is an 
attempt to explain what God’s actual reasons are for allowing moral evil, 
reasons that putatively justify God’s allowing it. A defense, by contrast, 
does not seek anything so ambitious as to state what God’s actual reasons 
are for allowing evil. Rather, a defense is a strategy that seeks to take the 
proposition that
(3) God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent
and add additional propositions to it that are jointly possible with (3), and 
which together with (3) entail
(4) Moral evils exist,
thus demonstrating that (3) and (4), despite appearances, are logically 
consistent. It does not matter whether these additional propositions are 
actually true. What matters is whether or not they describe some possible 
state of affairs. The Free Will Defense, then, suggests that it is the good of 
4Pawl and Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 401.
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creaturely free will and God’s desire to actualize that good that provides 
us with the other propositions we need. In point of fact, though, there are 
two different ways that the FWD can be developed. What I will call the 
Strong Version of the FWD (FWDS) goes something like the following:
(5S) Free will is a great good that justifies the existence of the moral evil 
that will occur if it exists.
(6S) God desires to bring about a world that contains the great good of 
free will.
(7S) God cannot bring about a world that contains free will but contains 
no evil.
Following Plantinga, (5S) and (7S) could be motivated by surmising that 
God already knows (perhaps via middle knowledge) that, in any possible 
world he could create that contains free creatures, at least some of those 
creatures go wrong. So, any world he creates that contains free will also 
contains some moral evil. And, by (5S), that moral evil is justified. Thus, 
we have a pretty rigorous demonstration that (3) and (4) are not logically 
contradictory, but are in fact consistent.
It is, in my mind anyway, impossible to disagree with this. Yet it might 
be objected that, since a compatibilist likely thinks that libertarianism is 
not only false but necessarily false, he will say that (7S) is necessarily false 
as well. And this will mean that (3) and (4) have not been shown to be com-
possible as far as compatibilism is concerned. Fair enough. Still, a com-
patibilist could either (i) say that the FWD is successful insofar as one lays 
aside the question of whether libertarianism or compatibilism is the better 
account of free will, or (ii) say that, for all we know, libertarianism is true, 
and thus the FWD shows that (3) and (4) are compossible for all we know.5
Of course, what is central to FWDS is that free will is viewed by God as 
intrinsically good, and God creates a world containing free creatures in part 
for the sake of free will itself. So, according to (5S), it is free will itself that 
justifies God in allowing for the possibility (and eventual reality) of moral 
evil. When Pawl and Timpe write that “free will . . . is such a great good 
that it justifies the existence of the moral evil that it makes possible” (cited 
above), it would appear that FWDS is the version of the FWD they hold.6
However, when we consider the question of theodicy, in contrast to a 
defense, we will begin to see not only that a bare appeal to free will can 
never be suitable for the former, but also why Pawl’s and Timpe’s concern 
about compatibilism vis-à-vis the FWD is misguided. For starters, note 
5Thanks to an anonymous referee for this last point. 
6Swinburne appears to think that Plantinga originally understood the FWD this way, 
too (see Richard Swinburne, “Evil Does not Show that there Is No God,” in Philosophy of 
Religion: A Guide and Anthology, ed. Brian Davies [Oxford University, 2000], 599–613). Mi-
chael Tooley also appears to construe the FWD this way (see his article, “The Problem of 
Evil” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [accessed at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
evil/#The]).
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that proposition (5S) is almost certainly false. It is at least far from obvious 
that free will is a great good that justifies the existence of the moral evil 
that it brings about. To prove the point, suppose that I am sitting on my 
front porch watching my ten-year-old son playing in the front yard with 
one of his friends. And let us suppose that I continue watching as he picks 
up a rather large stone with the evident intent of smashing his friend on 
the head with it. And then I watch in horror as he in fact does smash his 
friend on the head with the stone, killing him. Let us further suppose 
that I could have intervened in such a way as to prevent my son from hit-
ting his friend with the stone. Maybe I am fast enough that I could have 
jumped up and closed the distance between us and grabbed the stone 
from his hand before he could swing it. But, despite my anguish and hor-
ror at what I foresaw happening, I did not so intervene, but allowed my 
son to make this lethal choice. Later, you ask me why I didn’t intervene 
and stop him. I answer, “Free will.” Somewhat confused, you ask, “What 
do you mean?” I reply, “Free will is a great good that justifies the existence 
of the evil that results from it. My son exercised his free will when he 
smashed his friend on the head and that freedom justifies my allowing 
him to do it.” To which you rightly respond, “That’s crazy!”
My point is that libertarian freedom, if it exists, may be a good, and it 
may even be a good that justifies some tiny, insignificant amount of evil. 
But it is not a good that comes anywhere near justifying the amount or 
kind of evil that actually exists.7 If I’m right about this, the FWDS may be 
an interesting exercise in logic, and, offered strictly as a defense, it may 
be enough to silence the obstreperous likes of J. L. Mackie, but when it’s 
all said and done, we know for a fact that the mere good of free will is not 
the reason why God allows evil in the world. That is, even granting that 
a bare appeal to free will makes for an adequate defense, we know that 
it is not sufficient for the purpose of theodicy. We know it because of our 
7An anonymous referee of an earlier draft of this paper objected to the above thought 
experiment used to make this point, writing that “the author invites us to compare the 
value of a single exercise of freedom with the moral evil that it brings about (or is). To 
show that (5S) is false a global comparison would be needed. It would have to weigh all 
moral evil, on the one hand, against the value of libertarian freedom in general, including 
those exercises of freedom that result in great goods.” In response, I think the referee has 
misunderstood the point in context. With regard to the strong version of the FWD, we are 
considering whether or not libertarian freedom is an intrinsic good that is good enough to 
outweigh the moral evils that are produced by it. If our intuitions tell us (as I argue) that 
the intrinsic good of free will does not justify my (or God’s!) allowing my son to kill his 
friend, then it is hard to see how multiplying the examples of evil free acts to the global 
scale is supposed to help. That is, if one seriously evil act cannot be justified by the intrinsic 
good of free will, then neither can millions of seriously evil acts be so justified. When the 
referee suggests that I need also to consider “those exercises of freedom that result in great 
goods,” he is confusing the strong version of the FWD with the weak version discussed be-
low. Certainly, if, on the global level, exercises of libertarian freedom produce sufficiently 
weighty greater goods, then such freedom may be justified even in the face of the moral 
evil it also produces. But in that case, we are no longer discussing (5S) or the strong version 
of the FWD which have to do with whether or not libertarian freedom is intrinsically good 
enough (sans any resultant extrinsic goods) to justify the evils that will occur. And it is 
fairly obvious that it is not.
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intuitions regarding the scenario I just painted. We know it every time we 
stop a person from exercising his free will to commit suicide. We know 
it every time we lock up criminals who exercise their freedom to do bad 
things. We simply don’t think that the intrinsic good of free will is worth 
it. This is likely what prompts Paul Helm to remark, “The objections to the 
exercise of human libertarian freedom being the only or supreme aim and 
end of creation are too obvious to need spelling out.”8
Obvious or not, I’ve stated the objection here because it goes to the heart 
of Pawl’s and Timpe’s rejection of the compatibilist solution to the Prob-
lem of Heavenly Freedom. They believe that compatibilism undermines 
the FWD. But, why is that? As a defense, the FWDS is unobjectionable to 
the compatibilist, as I indicated above. The only problem that compatibil-
ism raises for the FWDS is that the compatibilist, when seeking to give a 
theodicy rather than a defense, is going to reject either proposition (5S) or 
(6S) above (or both). The only way I can make sense of Pawl’s and Timpe’s 
objection is to take them to mean that the FWDS depends upon something 
like (5S) actually being true. But, not only is the truth of (5S) not a requisite 
for the FWDS, we all know that (5S) is in fact not true.
The second version of the FWD I will call the Weak Version of the FWD 
(FWDW). On this version, it is not the good of free will per se that justifies 
God in permitting evil. Rather than speaking of free will as an intrinsic 
good, some defenders of the FWD speak of it as an instrumental good. 
That is, they speak of certain moral goods that are produced by free will as 
being what justifies God in permitting evil. Alvin Plantinga, for example, 
could be interpreted to espouse something like FWDW when he states that 
the “heart of the Free Will Defense is the claim that it is possible that God 
could not have created a universe containing moral good (or as much moral 
good as this world contains) without creating one that also contained moral 
evil.”9 Elsewhere he writes, “If [God] aims to produce moral good, then he 
must create significantly free creatures upon whose cooperation he must 
depend.”10 Though the content of the “moral good” that Plantinga refers 
to in these quotes is not specified, it would seem that it is not simply the 
intrinsic good of free will itself that is in view, but some further goods to 
which free will is merely instrumental. Such goods might include morally 
significant actions, or the possession by agents of certain moral virtues such 
as courage and mercy, or human happiness, and so on.
But once one stipulates that it is such further goods that are God’s ulti-
mate aim in allowing evil and not simply the intrinsic good of free will 
8Paul Helm, “God, Compatibilism, and the Authorship of Sin,” Religious Studies 46 
(2010): 115–124.
9Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), 31.
10Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 190. Those who 
are more explicit in portraying the FWD in terms of FWDW include Eleonore Stump, “The 
Problem of Evil,” Faith and Philosophy 2.4 (October 1985): 392–423, and Michael L. Peterson, 
“The Problem of Evil,” in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. Philip L. Quinn and 
Charles Taliaferro (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997), 394.
422 Faith and Philosophy
itself, then to be precise we have to replace propositions (5S) through (7S) 
with something like these:
(5W) Free will is a necessary condition of certain moral goods that jus-
tify the existence of the moral evil that will occur if it exists.
(6W) God desires to bring about a world that contains these moral goods.
(7W) God cannot bring about a world that contains these moral goods 
without creating creatures with free will who will do the moral 
evil that will occur if it exists.
Once one understands the FWD this way, though, it seems the so-called 
FWD is simply a version of the Greater Good Defense (GGD), according to 
which God allows evil in the world in order to bring about some good or 
goods that require moral evil as a precondition and which, all things con-
sidered, outweigh the evils that are their precondition.11 Those goods might 
consist in the production of particular kinds of virtues, human happiness, 
etc.—some of the very same kinds of things that the FWDW advocate sees as 
the justification for allowing free will and the evil that comes from it. What 
distinguishes the FWDW from other versions of the GGD is the addition of 
proposition (5W), the idea that free will is necessary to bringing about the 
further goods that God wants to produce in the world.
Now, it may very well be the case that (5W), or something like it, is true 
(though as a compatibilist I deny it). But, I cannot see why, from the stand-
point of making a defense as opposed to a theodicy, the FWDW is so much 
more preferable to, or superior to, other versions of the GGD (versions per-
haps friendly to compatibilism) so as to warrant a rejection of a compatibil-
ist solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom. The fact that the FWD has 
been influential in recent years in laying the logical problem of evil to rest is 
really beside the point. That laudable task simply requires, as stated above, 
11One might wonder why the strong version of the FWD should not also count as a version 
of the greater good defense. After all, on the FWDS, God allows evil in order to bring about 
the (putatively) greater good of free will itself. No doubt all responses to the logical problem 
of evil will have some such similarities in that they all, in one way or another, are attempts 
to show that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. Nevertheless, many au-
thors routinely distinguish between free will defenses/theodicies and greater good defens-
es/theodicies, and I am simply following that convention. (See, e.g., William J. Wainwright, 
Philosophy of Religion [Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1988], 66–89; Daniel Howard-Snyder, 
“God, Evil, and Suffering,” in Reason for the Hope Within, ed. Michael J. Murray [Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999], 76–115; Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 
3rd ed. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004], 208–219; John S. Feinberg, The Many Faces 
of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problem of Evil [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994], 54–98, 
106–111; New Dictionary of Christian Apologetics, ed. W. C. Campbell-Jack and Gavin McGrath 
[Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2006], s.v. “Evil,” by H. A. G. Blocher.) Moreover, free will 
defenders of both the strong and weak versions focus their attention primarily on the value 
of free will in distinction from other goods extrinsic to free will. My point here is that 
the FWDW, because it sees the value of free will in its ability to produce the same kinds of 
goods that greater good defenders promote, is more relevantly like the GGD than the FWDS 
that has no interest in goods extrinsic to free will. If one insists here on greater precision, 
then what I am claiming is that the FWDW is simply a (not clearly preferable) version of the 
Greater Extrinsic Good Defense (GEGD), where “extrinsic” means “extrinsic to free will.”
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a logically consistent set of propositions that contains the proposition (3) 
and that jointly entails (4). And the FWDW does not seem any better off than 
other versions of the GGD in this regard. If anything, the FWDW adds an 
unnecessary complication to the GGD by requiring what might be taken to 
be the superfluous (and, might I add, controversial) (5W). For an adequate 
response to the logical problem of evil requires no more than the following:
(3) God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
(4) Moral evils exist.
(8) An omnibenevolent being desires to bring about certain goods 
(such as a state of affairs that maximizes human happiness or well-
being, or certain moral virtues like courage and mercy).
(9) Some of the goods that an omnibenevolent being desires to bring 
about require moral evil as a precondition, and these goods out-
weigh the value of the evil that is their precondition.
This set of propositions is no less logically consistent than that offered by 
the advocates of either version of the FWD, and (8) and (9) together with 
(3) entail (4). Moreover, this set has the virtue of being neutral regard-
ing the question of libertarian freedom. Why, then, should we not prefer 
this more generic GGD over the FWDW? The only reason I can think of is 
that one thinks that the only kinds of goods that could justify God in al-
lowing evil are goods that are brought about by human agency and that 
libertarian freedom is the only view of freedom that coherently allows for 
the possibility of those goods. But, even if this is true, it seems to me that 
these would be matters for a theodicy and not a defense, since in a defense 
one would want to make as few controversial metaphysical assumptions 
as possible. In any case, we would need some very powerful arguments 
for such theses before dismissing compatibilism as a solution to the Prob-
lem of Heavenly Freedom on the grounds that it undermines the FWD.
To reiterate my main points under this heading: First, compatibilism 
simply does not provide any challenge to the FWD understood as a defense. 
Compatibilists can happily embrace the FWD as providing a set of propo-
sitions that make coherent God’s permission of evil, even though (as the 
compatibilist believes) one or more of those propositions is actually false. 
Second, it is not clear that the FWD is philosophically superior to other 
defenses against the logical problem of evil, especially when one realizes 
that a commonly-held version of the FWD—i.e., FWDW—is simply a com-
plex version of a more simple (and perfectly adequate) generic GGD. For 
these reasons, Pawl and Timpe need other more serious reasons to reject 
compatibilism as a response to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom.
Does Compatibilism Make the Problem of Evil More Acute?
No doubt Pawl and Timpe do think they have stronger reasons to reject com-
patibilism. They allude to such reasons in their discussion of compatibilism 
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and its relation to the FWD. It is not just that compatibilism is (in their 
view) inconsistent with the FWD, but also that compatibilism “makes the 
logical problem of evil even more acute than it already is” and that “there 
are good philosophical reasons to reject compatibilism.”12 For the latter, 
they footnote a reference to the well-known Consequence Argument 
defended by Peter van Inwagen and others.13 I agree that there are forceful 
philosophical concerns raised for compatibilism. It is not my purpose in 
this article, however, to address the coherence and adequacy of compati-
bilism in providing an account of human freedom and responsibility.14 
My primary concern is over whether or not compatibilism (taken as given 
vis-à-vis a theory of freedom and responsibility) can adequately handle 
the Problem of Heavenly Freedom.
More closely related to this objective are the theological concerns that 
Pawl and Timpe raise. So, regarding the former point, all that Pawl and 
Timpe state in the article under consideration about how it is that com-
patibilism makes the logical problem of evil “more acute” is their claim 
that a compatibilist view of freedom makes it possible that “God could 
actualize the good of free will . . . without the possibility of moral evil by 
determining all free creatures never to do evil.”15 Elsewhere, Kevin Timpe 
elaborates on the point being made here:
If humans have libertarian free will, then God cannot create a world con-
taining such [libertarian] agents and unilaterally guarantee that that world 
contains no evil. Libertarians can therefore maintain a distinction between 
possible worlds and feasible worlds. Compatibilism, on the other hand, 
cannot so easily make the claim that God cannot create a world containing 
such agents and unilaterally guarantee that that world contains no evil.16
Part of what Timpe says here is true. I readily grant that God cannot 
create a world containing creatures with libertarian freedom and guar-
antee that there be no evil. And it is this point which allows the defender 
of the FWD to make his crucial distinction between possible and feasible 
worlds. But I deny that the compatibilist cannot make a similar distinction 
in response to the problem of evil. For while it is true that God can make 
creatures with compatibilist freedom and at the same time guarantee that 
they never do evil, it is not possible for God to make creatures with com-
patibilist freedom, desire to bring about greater goods that require moral evil as a 
precondition, and at the same time guarantee that they never do evil. If God 
12Pawl and Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 401.
13See Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).
14But see John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); John 
Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility 
(Cambridge University, 1999); Lynne Rudder Baker, “Why Christians Should not Be Liber-
tarians”; and Steven B. Cowan, Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: A Compatibilist 
Reconciliation (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arkansas, 1996).
15Pawl and Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 401.
16Kevin Timpe, “Why Christians Might Be Libertarians: A Response to Lynne Rudder 
Baker,” Philosophia Christi 6.2 (2004): 279–288.
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wants to create a world that maximizes some good or set of goods, and 
those goods require that human agents (understood as having compatibilist 
freedom and that freedom being adequate for moral responsibility) do evil, 
then God cannot bring about those goods unless he creates creatures who 
do the requisite evils. So, a distinction is available to the compatibilist (let’s 
call it the distinction between possible worlds and goal-fulfilling worlds) that 
is analogous to the distinction between possible worlds and feasible worlds 
utilized by the libertarian.17 And this distinction between possible worlds 
and goal-fulfilling worlds, though a weaker one, can do the same work vis-
à-vis the problem of evil that the possible worlds/feasible worlds distinction 
does for the libertarian. So, it is hard to see how compatibilism makes the 
logical problem of evil more acute on that score.
Elsewhere, however, Timpe raises a different reason for why compati-
bilism exacerbates the problem of evil. He writes, “If God is the ultimate 
cause of all human actions . . . , then He bears some direct responsibility 
for every action that occurs. . . . To say that God is not the author of some 
evil act appears to many to be doublespeak.”18 Here is the main worry 
that usually comes up in discussions about the theological adequacy of 
compatibilism. On a compatibilist view of freedom, it seems difficult if 
not impossible to exonerate God from moral culpability in our evil actions 
since God ultimately determines (in some way) everything that we do.
My response is to suggest, per ad hominem, that if there is a worry at 
all here, it infects most libertarian answers to the problem of evil just as 
severely.19 In other words, compatibilism doesn’t make God any more cul-
pable for our sin than most libertarian views do; so, if making God the 
author of sin is a problem for compatibilism, it is equally a problem for the 
libertarian. To see this, let us lay aside any purely philosophical worries 
about the adequacy of compatibilism as a theory of agency and/or moral 
responsibility. Let us assume that agents with compatibilist freedom are 
morally responsible for their actions. Let us also lay aside any parallel con-
cerns over libertarianism (such as whether it implies that human actions 
are uncaused or arbitrary). Furthermore, let us assume, as compatibilist 
theists and most libertarian theists do, a traditional, classical version of 
theism that holds that God exercises a strong providence over his creation, 
and that God has perfect knowledge of future contingents including the 
future actions of his free creatures (whether that freedom is compatibilist 
or libertarian).
17Thanks to Tom Flint for helping me to clarify the similarities and differences between 
these two distinctions. While both distinctions have the effect of “tying God’s hands” with 
regard to a subset of possible worlds that he can actualize, they are nevertheless not the 
same. For infeasible worlds, as the libertarian is using the term, refers to worlds that are not 
available to God regardless of his desires and goals, while non-goal-fulfilling worlds are 
unavailable to God only in virtue of his goals and desires.
18Kevin Timpe, “Why Christians Might Be Libertarians,” 283–284.
19Here I am following a line of argument presented by Paul Helm in “God, Compatibil-
ism, and the Authorship of Sin,” 121–122.
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It follows on these assumptions, that if God accomplishes his provi-
dential goals through agents with compatibilist freedom, then there is a 
sense in which he is responsible for what his creatures do. He is respon-
sible in the sense that he plays a causal role in what his free creatures do 
(though what causal role may differ among various compatibilist philoso-
phers). Nevertheless, the human agents involved are morally responsible 
for what they do and God’s intentions for why they do what they do will, 
in many cases, differ from the intentions of the human agents (e.g., “You 
meant it for evil, but God meant it for good”—Gen. 50:20). So, God has 
some responsibility in what his creatures do even when they do evil. The 
really salient question, though, is whether or not this “authorship of sin” 
is such as to make God morally culpable or blameworthy. This is a question 
that will have to await another occasion.
What I want to do now is to say that on the libertarian account God is no 
less the “author of sin,” at least not in any way that is morally relevant. For it 
follows on the same assumptions that if God accomplishes his providential 
goals through agents with libertarian freedom, there is a serious sense in 
which God is responsible for what his creatures do. Even though on the lib-
ertarian account God lacks the direct causal involvement that he has on the 
compatibilist account, it is still the case that everything that happens—good 
and evil—happens because God at least consciously permits it. A God with 
perfect foreknowledge is not caught off-guard by sin. He can anticipate every 
evil act of every free creature and he has the power and wisdom to intervene 
and prevent those evil acts if he wants to. Moreover, even for the libertarian, 
God plays a strong causal role in enabling evil actions. For a free creature to 
perform an evil action, God must causally sustain that creature’s existence 
and all of his causal powers. As Paul Helm puts it, even on the libertarian ac-
count, “God knowingly created and sustained the person of Adolph Hitler, 
infallibly knowing that Auschwitz would follow, while retaining the power 
to cut short this devilish regime at any time.”20 Why doesn’t God intervene 
to prevent such horrors and lesser evils? The libertarian answer can be no 
different than the compatibilist answer: because God intends (or at least in-
tends to permit) those evil things to happen—though his intentions are dif-
ferent than the intentions of the human agents. God allows these things to 
bring about a greater good. But, he allows them just the same.
To bring out more clearly the fact that there is no morally significant 
difference in the libertarian and compatibilist views on this matter, con-
sider the following two theses (where S is some human agent, X is some 
evil act, and G is some overriding good that X brings about) which I will 
call, respectively, the Compatibilist Greater Good Thesis and the Libertarian 
Greater Good Thesis:
(CGGT) God compatibilistically causes S to do X to bring about G.
(LGGT) God knowingly permits S to do X to bring about G.
20Ibid., 121.
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As Helm would say, there are differences between CGGT and LGGT, but 
“is there much of a moral difference?”21 I don’t think so. Where the inten-
tions of God are the same in both cases (to bring about a greater good), 
and where the agents in both cases are morally responsible, there is no 
morally significant difference between God’s causing S to do X and God’s 
knowingly permitting S to do X. If there is such a difference, it is incum-
bent on the libertarian to tell us what it is. If there is no difference, as I 
suggest, then any objection to theistic compatibilism on the grounds that 
it makes God the author of sin is likewise an objection to classical theistic 
libertarianism.
All the points in this section imply that there is no serious objection 
to compatibilism as a solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom that 
is independent of the purely philosophical objections to compatibilism. 
Those objections aside, there would seem to be no clear reason to prefer 
another solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom to the simple and 
straightforward solution offered by compatibilism.
Do Pawl and Timpe Solve the Problem of Heavenly Freedom?
But what about Pawl’s and Timpe’s solution to the problem? Is it a vi-
able alternative to the compatibilist solution? In this section of the paper, 
I would like to offer a couple of problems that call that suggestion into 
question. To do that, however, I need to provide a brief sketch of their 
view of the matter.
Their solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom is a variation on that 
offered by James Sennett a few years ago.22 The gist of Sennett’s solution is 
that there is, strictly speaking, no libertarian free will in heaven. Instead, 
the saints in heaven have a kind of compatibilist freedom in which their 
characters, made perfectly holy, determine what they do. However, their 
holy characters are, in part, the result of libertarian choices made in this 
life. In other words, though granting that there is only a compatibilist sort 
of freedom in heaven, Sennett believes that it is a necessary condition of 
heavenly saints’ moral responsibility that they once exercised libertarian 
freedom and that that exercise of freedom played a significant role in their 
formation of their characters. This allows that the redeemed in heaven are 
morally responsible, in libertarian terms, for their characters, so that it can 
make sense (again, in libertarian terms) to say that they are responsible 
for their actions in heaven.
Pawl and Timpe like aspects of Sennett’s solution, but they do not like 
his idea that there is nothing like libertarian freedom in heaven. They 
attempt to improve on Sennett’s view by arguing that there can be lib-
ertarian choices in heaven even though there cannot be sinful choices in 
heaven. So, Pawl and Timpe agree with Sennett that “during pre-heavenly 
21Ibid. (emphasis mine).
22James F. Sennett, “Is There Freedom in Heaven?” Faith and Philosophy 16.1 (January 
1999): 69–82.
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existence a person has the ability to form a moral character which later 
precludes that person from willing certain things.”23 Nevertheless, they 
go on to argue that there would still be libertarian choices. They claim 
that “even if one’s character determines that one not perform certain ac-
tions, it doesn’t determine all the actions that one does perform.”24 The 
idea here is that one could still make choices between alternative good op-
tions. For instance, one could make a libertarian choice between singing in 
the heavenly choir or playing the harp. More significantly, one could also 
do what they call “morally relevant” actions in which one good action is 
morally better than alternative good actions. Pawl and Timpe specifically 
have supererogatory actions in mind here. If A is an ordinary good action 
and B is some supererogatory action that is mutually exclusive of A, then, 
say Pawl and Timpe, an agent who does B is morally better than an agent 
who does A even though the agent who does A is not morally bad in any 
way (since supererogatory actions are not obligatory).
My first objection to Pawl and Timpe’s view would be equally a chal-
lenge to Sennett’s view. On both accounts, it is argued that to make moral 
sense of the limitation on the freedom of the redeemed in heaven, it must 
be the case that the redeemed have libertarian freedom at some earlier 
time, the exercise of which was causally relevant to the formation of their 
later choice-limiting characters. My problem with this idea has to do with 
the analogy of being that exists between God and his human creatures. 
God, presumably, has the very same limitation on his actions that Sennett, 
Pawl, and Timpe envision for the redeemed in heaven. God has a per-
fectly good character such that he is incapable of doing evil. I don’t know 
if Sennett would cash out God’s “freedom” in the compatibilist terms that 
he suggests for the redeemed in heaven, but I’m pretty confident that Pawl 
and Timpe would say basically the same thing about God that they do 
about the redeemed, namely that God, though incapable of doing evil, can 
choose between multiple good options including those that have moral 
relevance as defined above. But, here is the rub. God’s impeccability is 
an essential characteristic of him. This means that there never was (nor 
could there ever have been) a time in the past in which God had the “full-
blown” kind of libertarian freedom that Sennett, Pawl, and Timpe say is 
a necessary condition for the appropriateness of the choice-limiting char-
acters had by the redeemed in heaven. But why this asymmetry? Why not 
say, instead, that what’s good for God is good for the creature—especially 
given that we are created in God’s image?25 In other words, I can see no 
23Pawl and Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 409.
24Ibid., 410.
25Tom Flint has alerted me to the fact that Anselm (among others) has attempted to an-
swer this question. According to Anselm, if a creature’s actions are always caused ultimate-
ly by the creator, they could not have the kind of genuine internal origination necessary for 
freedom. But God’s character can determine his free actions, since no one or nothing gave 
him that character. (See the discussion of Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams in Anselm 
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009], 171–192; Anselm’s own account may be found in 
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good reason why, given our beliefs about God and his freedom, it must be 
a necessary condition for the choice-limiting characters of the redeemed 
in heaven that they once had a more full-blown kind of libertarian free-
dom (or any kind of libertarian freedom, for that matter!).
Interestingly, Pawl and Timpe are aware of this asymmetry, but they 
seem to make nothing of it. They write, “On the view we are advancing, 
if a non-divine agent is free and has a moral character that precludes sin, 
there must have been a prior time when the agent was free and didn’t 
have a moral character that precludes sin.”26 In a footnote, they admit, 
“The qualifier ‘non-divine’ here is needed due to issues arising from the 
freedom of God Himself.”27 Exactly! The qualifier is “needed” given what 
we believe about God’s own freedom and their need to defend libertar-
ian freedom for human beings. But from a compatibilist perspective, an 
insistence on this asymmetry can only be seen as question-begging. A 
compatibilist can say (this one does say) that God’s kind of freedom is a 
model for our freedom and God’s freedom doesn’t look a whole lot like 
libertarian freedom, at least not the “full-blown” kind that includes the 
ability to sin. Moveover, it does not even seem clear that Pawl and Timpe 
are right that non-divine agents have to meet their stipulated condition. 
Are we to imagine that, if God had decided to not allow moral evil to enter 
his creation and had created Adam and Eve in the Garden with perfectly 
holy characters (like his own) so that they could not sin but had the kind 
of freedom that Pawl and Timpe envision for the redeemed in heaven, 
they would not be morally responsible for their choices? How could they 
not be morally responsible for their choices? It appears completely mysti-
fying (to me anyway) to think that they would not be morally responsible.
My second objection is aimed at Pawl’s and Timpe’s account of morally 
relevant actions in heaven. They argue that the redeemed in heaven can 
have libertarian freedom despite not being able to sin as long as they can 
freely choose between multiple good options that are morally relevant in 
a way that makes the one who does them morally better than one who 
doesn’t. Pawl and Timpe suggest that supererogatory actions would fit the 
bill. They say, “[O]ne can rightly judge someone to be a better person for 
choosing to perform a supererogatory action, even if refraining wouldn’t 
make her a morally bad person in any way.”28 A supererogatory action, 
of course, is one that is not obligatory but is especially praiseworthy. Put 
De libertate arbitrii, De casu diaboli, and Cur Deus Homo 2.5.) In response, a compatibilist may 
wonder if Anselm’s point about creatures simply begs the question against compatibilism. 
The compatibilist at least has strategies designed to mitigate that worry. Also, one may 
question whether or not the fact that God’s character doesn’t originate from an external 
source is a strong enough point to make a relevant moral difference. It would still be the 
case that God’s character is “given” to him involuntarily—i.e., he has no choice about what 
his character is. And it seems to me anyway that this fact is enough to make plausible the 
symmetry between God and creatures that I’m advocating here. 
26Pawl and Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 415.
27Ibid., 415n49.
28Ibid., 416.
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simply and imprecisely, it is an action that goes “above and beyond the 
call of duty.”
However, I don’t think supererogatory actions will do for Pawl and 
Timpe the work they want them to do. First, it needs at least to be men-
tioned that the nature and value, even the existence, of supererogation 
is a matter of some controversy.29 But let’s leave those problems aside for 
now. More important for our purposes is the way that Pawl and Timpe 
respond to an objection to their appeal to supererogation. Here’s how they 
describe the objection:
Now, if someone’s in heaven, we already know that he has a perfect moral 
character, for that’s a necessary condition of his being in heaven. But if one 
of the redeemed, say, Andrew, has a perfect moral character, how could he 
be judged “a better person” if he chooses to perform A rather than B, where 
neither A nor B is evil but A is better than B? And how can the choices he 
makes affect his character if he already, as one of the blessed in heaven, has a 
perfect moral character? How can he become better, by making more super-
erogatory choices, if he has already attained moral perfection?30
In response to this objection, Pawl and Timpe distinguish two ways of 
being morally perfect. One way is illustrated by a person who acquires 
the virtue of temperance, which entails his occupying the mean between 
gluttony and insensibility. Once one is precisely on this mean, one can-
not get any more on the mean. So, this way of being morally perfect has 
an upper limit. However, Pawl and Timpe suggest that it is plausible to 
think that a person on the mean of temperance can grow to “cling more 
tightly to the mean.” He can, that is, be more tenaciously committed to 
or grounded in that condition of character called temperance. Pawl and 
Timpe contend that this kind of moral perfection may not have an upper 
limit and would thus provide the basis for meaningful acts of superero-
gation among the redeemed in heaven. Perhaps they are right about this. 
But they go on to say that “if we think about clinging to the good rather 
than clinging to the mean, we can say that through the everlasting years 
that the blessed spend with God, they are neverendingly coming closer to 
Him, who is Goodness itself, ever clinging more tenaciously to Him.”31 It 
is these last comments that raise to the surface the reason why Paul’s and 
Timpe’s appeal to supererogation won’t work.
I think we can take it for granted that every one of the redeemed in 
heaven will strongly desire to be ever closer to God and cling ever more 
tenaciously to him as Pawl and Timpe suggest. All of the redeemed 
in heaven will undoubtedly echo the sentiments of the Psalmist who 
29For a detailed discussion of the various views and issues related to supererogation, 
see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, s.v. “Supererogation,” by David 
Heyd, http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/ supererogation.
30Pawl and Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 418 (emphasis in 
original).
31Ibid.
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declared, “The LORD is the portion of my inheritance. . . . You will make 
known to me the path of life; in Your presence is fullness of joy; in Your 
right hand there are pleasures forever” (Psalm 16:5, 11). Who among 
the redeemed in heaven won’t desire to experience the happiness of the 
knowledge of God to its fullest? Indeed, assuming that such a pursuit of 
the knowledge of God honors and glorifies God, we might even consider 
this pursuit obligatory (cf. 1 Cor. 10:31). In either case—whether out of a 
sense of obligation or an overriding desire for beatitude, or both—it would 
follow that none of the redeemed in heaven could refrain from “neverend-
ingly coming closer to Him” by performing the supererogatory actions 
that Paul and Timpe describe. If this pursuit is obligatory (as I suggest it 
might be), then the so-called “supererogatory” actions turn out not really 
to be supererogatory after all. But, even if they are not obligatory and are 
truly supererogatory, they cannot be libertarianly free actions. For no re-
deemed person in heaven, given his morally perfect character (in Pawl’s 
and Timpe’s first sense), could conceivably refrain from doing them.
About the best that Pawl and Timpe can do, I think, is claim that a re-
deemed person in heaven might have the option to choose between mul-
tiple, equally valuable supererogatory actions. But those choices, like the 
choice between whether to sing in the heavenly choir or play the harp, 
would be morally irrelevant choices. In that case, to paraphrase Ed Wi-
erenga, the only time the redeemed in heaven are free “is when it doesn’t 
matter what they do.”32 I submit that if that is all that the freedom of the 
redeemed in heaven comes to, then it is insignificant and cannot provide a 
strong libertarian alternative to the compatibilist solution to the Problem 
of Heavenly Freedom.33
Louisiana College
32Edward Wierenga, “The Freedom of God,” Faith and Philosophy 19.4 (October, 2002): 
425–436. An anonymous referee suggested that those sympathetic to Paul’s and Timpe’s 
view could offer a different kind of response as follows: “One kind of choice a redeemed 
person might face is whether to perform a supererogatory action that occurs to her or come 
up with a plan to perform an even better action (incompatible with the one she now has in 
mind). Even a person who approached this decision with the mindset of a glory-maximizer 
would not face a clear choice here.” However, it would seem to me that such a choice would 
be appropriate only if she had some very reasonable expectation that a better supereroga-
tory action would be available to her if she gave the matter careful deliberation. And in that 
case, as a glory-maximizer, she could not refrain from seeking to fulfill that expectation. 
Further, if the issue is simply a matter of her being uncertain as to which of a set of op-
tions would be most glorifying to God, then she might very well have libertarian freedom 
to choose in such a situation, but again, I would suggest that she is making a libertarian 
choice only “when it does not matter what she does.” For while one of the supererogatory 
options might be objectively better (when considering the action itself or its consequences), 
it cannot make her a better person—she is, after all, making a choice between options that 
are, as far as she knows, morally equivalent.
33I want to thank James Sennett, Justin Barnard, Keith Loftin, Thomas Flint, and two 
anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
